Technical
Assistance Packet #6 –
CRIME
PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN AND SECURITY TECHNOLOGY FOR SCHOOLS
Produced
for the Northwest Regional Educational Labs and Hamilton Fish Institute
by
Tod
Schneider, Safe Schools Consultant
Todschneider@hotmail.com
Introduction
Schools are generally safe
environments. Although chronic, lethal
violence does pose an ongoing threat to school-age youth in many economically
depressed urban centers, most of
The most important steps a
school can take in preventing crime involve the affective rather than physical environment.
These include promoting a positive school climate and culture, teaching and
modeling pro-social behaviors, and providing effective intervention when
anti-social behaviors occur, or when individual students demonstrate a
propensity for violence. In addition, school-wide
prevention and intervention strategies can mitigate threats. Each of these
considerations is addressed in other guidebooks in this series.
But the affective environment
is not the only issue. In a number of shootings, the perpetrators were so
severely mentally ill that the school’s ambiance was of little consequence. In
other cases, the shooters were not even remotely associated with the school. An
extreme example would be the 2004 massacre of 344 people at School Number One,
in Beslan,
North Ossetia,
Russia, by Chechen rebels.
The physical environment obviously
plays a critical role in keeping students safe.
The structure should provide an inviting environment in which children
can be protected from threats and learning can take place. Researchers are
continuing to study the role that a facility’s physical environment plays in
school safety. Meanwhile, educators and parents agree on the importance of
providing a safe school environment. Children who feel safe are both
psychologically and physiologically more receptive to learning.
How do schools determine where
the greatest threats are likely to come from? Every school must consider
different risk factors. Of all school-related homicides reported for 1992-1994,
only about one in three occurred inside a school building. The remaining two
thirds were equally divided between outdoor locations on campus, and locations
off site entirely (Kachur et al., 1996). The high-profile school shootings
since then have mostly occurred inside buildings—including the tragedies in
Having said that, it’s
important to remember that most schools will never experience a shooting, but
they will very likely face other threats. Bullying, domestic violence, crack
houses, custody battles, drug dealing, gang activity, bike theft and extreme
weather are much more commonplace threats to school children, although the
involved problems may be sited off campus, between home and school. Littleton,
Colorado’s public schools manager of security and emergency preparedness
estimates 25 outside threats for every one inside—including a dozen tornado
watches and 3-4 thunderstorm warnings in a recent one month period.
Decisions about whether to
remodel or rebuild are complex, and must take a variety of logistic, economic
and political factors into account. In some cases, band-aid improvements are
all that can be done. In other cases, communities are willing to shoulder bond
measures to build the best possible school, from the ground up. In either case,
and along the continuum of compromises in between, many improvements can be
made. New, security-oriented design
measures are often crisis-driven. Highly visible, superficial responses may look
good politically, but may in fact fail to correspond to the problems supposedly
being addressed. A comprehensive examination of site weaknesses must occur
before an effective solution can be put in place. That examination can draw on a number of
approaches, including user surveys and safety audits. These reports can vary considerably in length
and complexity. As long as the perspective is broad enough to encompass all
aspects of the school, the results should be useful. By definition, such a broad examination falls
under the field known as Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED).
What This Guide Includes
This guidebook is intended to
help educators and other members of the community understand the relationship
between school safety and school facilities, including technology. It will
cover the following topics:
Crime Prevention Through
Environmental Design (CPTED)
Planning to apply CPTED
concepts
Security Technology
Safety Audits and Security
Surveys
Crime Prevention Through
Environmental Design (CPTED)
Most American schools are
falling apart. Age has caught up with them. Maintenance has often been deferred
to a point of diminishing returns.
Building deficiencies have become glaring over time, highlighted by
concerns over lead paint, asbestos, frayed wiring, decrepit plumbing,
ergonomics, inaccessibility, antiquated fire suppression systems, energy inefficiency
and technological obsolescence. A decade ago, the U.S. General Accounting
Office reported that one-third of all
But public alarm over those problems can be
dwarfed by the fear of school violence. The wave of dramatic mass shootings,
particularly in the 1990s, followed by a spate of shootings in 2006, underscored
the extraordinary vulnerability inherent in most schools' designs.
School architecture generally
falls into two categories: fortress and sprawl designs. Fortresses are usually
solitary structures, a bit reminiscent of medieval castles. This model was
particularly common in the first half of the 1900s. Sprawl designs became more
common from the 1960s onward in one of two ways: (1) by design, as the
campus-style approach, with a number of buildings spread over a site, was found
to be aesthetically pleasing, or (2) by default, as add-ons to existing schools
often involved "temporary" buildings scattered on-site wherever they
could be conveniently placed. Neither
design was particularly concerned with security issues.
Fortresses are, at first
glance, easier to secure. Students are either inside or outside, and once
inside they theoretically can rely on the security of a controlled environment.
Sprawling campuses are much more difficult to defend, as students are
constantly traveling between buildings, exposed to threats on the outside.
In fact, both designs fall
short: security entirely relying on containing students inside the school is no
panacea: up to a third of school violence routinely occurs indoors. In
addition, up to 70% of school-related violence occurs outside, half of that on
campus and the rest elsewhere in the community.
Neither design does a good job of taking this into account.
There is no simple solution.
Every campus has a unique mix of architecture, community characteristics and
funding to consider. Cost factors always
loom large, and other serious maintenance costs must be addressed as well.
Simple fixes relying on gross security measures -- ranging from metal detectors
to armed guards -- receive mixed reviews not only in terms of cost and
pragmatic effectiveness in promoting safety, but in terms of their impact on
school atmosphere. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) takes
a broader approach.
What is CPTED?
CPTED is the broad study and
design of environments to encourage desirable behavior, heighten functionality
and decrease antisocial behavior. Fundamental
CPTED emphasizes physical design, while advanced, or “second generation” CPTED,
addresses the affective, psychological and sociological environmental design.
This guide focuses on fundamental issues.
Historical Overview
CPTED has emerged as a field
gradually over the past 50 years. Jane Jacob's The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1960) was a giant
early step in the direction of conscious environmental planning for public
spaces. C. Ray Jeffery's book Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
was published in 1971. Oscar Newman's Defensible
Space, followed in 1972. His "broken windows" theory pointed out
the impact that visible deterioration and neglect in neighborhoods had on
behavior. Since that time, many other criminologists, sociologists, architects
and planners have developed the field further.
Canadian academicians Pat and Paul Brantingham, and consultants Greg
Saville and Paul Wong made significant contributions from the 1980s on, while
British criminologists Patricia Mayhew and Ronald Clark worked on
"situational crime prevention." Criminologist Tim Crowe's 1991 book, Crime Prevention Through Environmental
Design: Applications of Architectural Design and Space Management Concepts,
became a standard textbook in the field. Stan and Sherry Carter have carried
the CPTED banner in
Basic Concepts
Fundamental CPTED is built on
three factors: natural surveillance, natural access control and territoriality.
Natural surveillance is the
capacity to see what's occurring without having to take special measures to do
so. Clear direct views, such as are
provided by windows, provide natural surveillance. An adult presence does the same, with a
notable impact on behavior. If responding to a call for help or a loud noise
requires stepping through a solid door, or around a blind corner, natural
surveillance is missing, and the response may be too little too late. We see the aftermath, but we don't know what
initially occurred. If lighting is inadequate, we have even less hope of
determining what happened.
Natural access control is the
capacity to limit who can gain entry to a facility, and how. A school with dozens of un-secured exterior
doors cannot hope to control comings and goings. Intruders have free rein, and
schools must rely on other security measures.
Without access control, a much greater emphasis must be placed on
surveillance, territoriality, school climate and security staffing in order to
compensate.
Territoriality is the capacity
to establish authority over an environment, making a statement about who is in
charge, who belongs, and who is an outsider.
Graffiti is one way gangs establish territoriality; schools take it back
by re-painting, and with vigilant maintenance.
Signs directing visitors to the office or spelling out rules reinforce
territoriality and influence behavior. School uniforms make it easy to identify
intruders at a glance.
CPTED Planning: Key Questions
Although the fine details of
safe school planning can become overwhelmingly complex, an excellent framework
to start with can be built from answers to the eight key questions listed
below. Each question will be addressed
in greater detail in the following pages, including suggested solutions.
Eight key questions
1. What
risks and opportunities do students encounter between home and school?
2. What
risks and opportunities are posed in areas directly adjoining school property?
3. Can
office staff observe approaching visitors before they reach the school entry?
4. Do
staff members have the physical ability to stop visitors from entering?
5. How
well can people see what's going on inside the school?
6. Do
staff members have immediate lockdown capability in classrooms and other
locations?
7. Is
the overall school climate pro-social?
8. Are
there identifiable or predictable trouble spots or high risk locations?
1. What risks and opportunities
to students encounter between home and school?
Regardless of school climate
and architecture, if students have to traverse war zones, uncontrolled traffic,
crime scenes, toxic exposure or isolating territory in order to reach school,
they are put at risk. In 2005, 5-10 percent of students feared being attacked
while traveling to and from school. The most fearful were Black and Hispanic
students, or students in urban schools (Dinkes 2006). In 1999, 4 percent of
students surveyed feared being attacked while traveling to and from school –
down from 7 percent in 1995 (Kaufman et al., 2001). Even when they reach
relatively safe schools, high states of anxiety can compromise students’
ability to learn.
If students walk to school,
what is that experience like? Do they
dread a daily shakedown at the hands of local bullies? Are they crossing gang
territory? Do they risk being drawn into
using alcohol or other drugs, or lured into prostitution? Do sex offenders live along the route to
school? Are they able to ascertain when individual children are isolated and
vulnerable?
What physical risk does the
environment pose? Abandoned or derelict buildings, along with dark alleys,
provide easy locations into which pedophiles and other criminals can lure
children. Heavy traffic can pose a
threat to pedestrians and bicyclists. Industrial facilities can expose children
to toxic substances.
What messages are conveyed
along this route? How are people portrayed in posters, billboards, graffiti and
advertisements? Do these messages contradict the world view promoted at school?
Are children likely to live by pro-social values only in specific settings,
such as at home, in school, or even in a particular class?
Solutions
Providing students with a safe
route to school can reduce their fears considerably, having a tremendous impact
on school attendance and performance, along with safety. Depending on staffing
priorities, police officers may be able to focus on these routes during
specified times. Not only does this improve route safety, but it also provides
an opportunity for officers to establish positive relationships with children
under non-traumatic circumstances, laying the groundwork for community policing
programs. Emergency call buttons or
standard pay phones should be accessible, at a height suitable for children or
wheelchair users along the way.
Organizing a neighborhood cleanup can reduce physical risks and build a
support network at the same time. Graffiti can be painted over, and offensive
advertising can be discouraged through organized social and political pressure.
Neighbors along the route to school, armed with cell phones or radios, can be
recruited to serve as crossing guards or monitors. Drawing friendly neighbors out onto the
sidewalks makes the environment considerably safer -- offenders always prefer
to isolate their victims from potential witnesses and allies.
Businesses and residents can
work with the police in establishing safe havens along the route, into which
children can retreat when they feel threatened, and where help is readily
available. Programs like Block Home and
"Walking School
Buses" can be organized, in which children and adults coordinate traveling
in groups to and from school, providing security through numbers. Neighbors who step forward in the name of
school safety may also be willing to participate in other school-supportive
activities, voting for bond measures, attending school performances and
athletic events, or volunteering their time as classroom aides or guest
speakers, and businesses may serve as sites for community service projects or
field trips, internships or after-school jobs.
2. What risks and opportunities
are posed in areas directly adjoining school property?
Concerns posed along the route
to school are at least as significant in the areas directly adjacent to the
school. These are the areas where
students commonly are found engaged in behaviors forbidden on campus, making
them doubly vulnerable to criminal enticements. An offender looking for child
victims can predict accessibility at these locations.
Students can alienate neighbors
by using their front yards as ash trays, picking fights in front of their
businesses, or monopolizing parking spaces. Inadequate parking on campus can
lead to traffic jams and overload nearby streets. If residents cannot park at
their own homes, and if customers cannot park at local businesses, this will
probably lead to resentment, driving a wedge between the school and its
neighbors.
Drug dealing or alcohol outlets
anywhere near a school increase the likelihood of substance-abuse fueled
antisocial behavior, either by students or against students. Industrial facilities may expose students to
hazardous substances, which can have devastating effects on brain development,
health in general, and the corresponding ability to learn.
Solutions
Most cities, backed up by
federal law, place restrictions on drugs, weapons and other illegal activities
within a specific radius of school property.
Paroled sex offenders should be restricted from living near schools or
children as a condition of release. Look into how aggressively these restrictions
are enforced in your community.
Be good neighbors. Attend to conflicts, and help involved
parties design solutions. Ignoring a
problem because it is technically off campus is not productive in the long run.
If parking on campus is inadequate, make some changes. Restrict parking to
residents with required stickers, or limit it to only 2 hours in commercial
zones. Open fields for overflow parking.
Encourage student carpooling or mass transit use with incentives, such as
assigned parking spots or discounted bus passes.
Changes in fencing and
landscaping can open up areas that are hidden from view. Replacing solid wood
with wrought iron fencing, or trimming overgrown hedges, are two examples.
School windows can be cleared of obstructions, allowing staff to observe
behavior on the street. Store windows
can also be cleared, allowing passers by to observe crimes in progress and
respond appropriately, such as by calling police. Students might be recruited
to clean up problem areas, build fences, or paint over graffiti. This may
discourage immediate problems while building long-term goodwill. This positive
interaction can build a shared sense of belonging, leading to mutual assistance
when either students or neighbors are in need of help.
Neighbors are positioned to
serve as critical eyes and ears for a school, before and after hours. No
security service can compete in terms of providing a continual presence, as
well as in commitment to the neighborhood. Neighbors are more likely to spot
vandals in the act than are police or private security. Currying these
neighbors as allies is well worth it. Provide them with administration phone
numbers. In some cases, entice them with binoculars, cell phones or radios.
Empower selected neighbors as quasi-official school caretakers or allies.
Reward them for calling in crimes in progress, with recognition,
dinner-for-two, or other incentives. This is a cost-effective alternative to
paid security.
Carefully assess the potential
of neighboring facilities as potential command posts and evacuation sites in
emergencies. Make arrangements now, to
ensure that sites have already been arranged and equipped to serve during an
emergency. Map out various routes between the school and these sites, based on
the type and location of crises. Coordinate with police and emergency services
personnel in choosing these locations.
Staging sites will be needed for police, students, medics, and the
media, as well as for distraught family members responding to news coverage
during a crisis.
If the evacuation route and
site are predictable, these also must be examined for security weaknesses;
plans should include a scouting party, immediately preceding a major
evacuation, to check for suspicious packages or individuals along the route
before proceeding further.
In addition, a number of
communities have had excellent results with additional efforts to utilize law
enforcement officers to target the neighborhoods around each school for
pro-active engagement, including intensive traffic enforcement. When added to
other items mentioned above, this can result in dramatic improvement in the
perceived and actual level of safety. Such efforts have been especially
effective in areas of high drug and gang activity. State-mandated school safety
zones can also assist officers in this regard. Similarly, enforcement of school
safety zone statutes and ordinances relating to loitering in a school zone can
be effective. Another useful practice is for school officials to enact and
enforce policies that regulate student misconduct in these zones.
Some communities have had
success in having law enforcement officers contact owners of rental property
where criminal activity is being encountered near schools. Many landlords will
evict tenants due to concern that their property will be seized if drug arrests
are made. In other instances, parents who do not know that large numbers of
children are gathering at their residence while they are at work will authorize
officers to remove the problem element from their property. In Extreme cases, a
court-ordered eviction may be necessary.
3. Can office staff observe approaching visitors before they reach the school
entry?
Main office staff and
administrators are the most important players when it comes to school safety.
The office is the screening tool for most schools, expected to evaluate and
direct visitors, bar undesirables, placate the disgruntled and generally solve
problems.
Most offices are poorly sited
to fulfill these roles. Hidden deep within their respective schools, they are poorly
positioned to serve as guardians against unwelcome visitors. Even if located
near exterior doorways, there are usually many alternative access points;
intruders can easily gain entry undetected if they desire to do so, through
secondary doors or even through windows.
Fencing, landscaping, outbuildings, posters on windows, and poor
lighting can also undermine surveillance from the office outward.
School layout and signage can
actually exacerbate the problem. Frequently these signs lack maps, arrows or
other directions, and the office location is unclear. Visitors may be
instructed to check in at the office, but with inadequate guidance this can be
an invitation to prowl the halls while ostensibly looking for their
destination. Even if the office is
located at the main entry, it may lack appropriately located windows,
eliminating natural surveillance. The assumption that school staff can deal
with a threat that suddenly appears at the front desk is unrealistic.
Solution: The office and window
locations, reception desk and counter layout should be positioned to give the
receptionist as wide a view of the entry area as possible, inside and outside.
Security cameras can supplement the physical design, but a direct view is
better. Assess school office location based on the following criteria, starting
with the least desirable and progressively improving:
a.
The least useful office location is hidden
deep within the building. It is not adjacent to any exterior doorway, let alone
the main entry, and there may be many alternative access points as well. Office
staff members lack natural surveillance out of the office. They cannot see
people approaching the building, nor can they see people prowling the halls,
and they cannot control access in any way.
b.
Slightly better placement will bring the
office to a location that can be easily found, with its doorway flush with a
main hallway. It is still distant from the main entry, and provides no
opportunity for natural surveillance outside of the building. There may be a
window facing into the hallway, providing a small opportunity to view people
passing by, but staff are not in a position to anticipate or control them.
c.
Design the office to protrude into the
hall. This would allow staff to look up and down the hallway, assuming window
design and internal layout accommodate this.
d.
Position the office somewhere along the
perimeter of the school, allowing natural surveillance to the outside. On the
inside, the office should protrude into a main hallway, allowing natural
surveillance up and down at least the main hallway, and perhaps secondary
hallways as well. This still establishes no access control over visitors.
e.
Place the office directly adjacent to the
main entry, protruding into the hallway and to the outside of the school. Visitors who approach the main entry are
easily seen, and must pass close by to enter the school. Staff have good
visibility outside the main entry area and down the main hallway.
Unfortunately, secondary entrances still undermine the ability of the main
office to observe or control unwanted visitors.
4. Do staff members have the
physical ability to stop visitors from entering?
Even if staff can see intruders
approaching, can they really do anything about it? Surveys in the late 1990s
found that about half of all public schools claimed to control access, although
whether they were successful or not was not clear (Kaufman 1999). In the
2003-04 school year, 83 percent controlled access to buildings by locking or
monitoring doors during school hours (Dinkes 2006). Are the doors already
locked, as a matter of course once school starts? How quickly and easily can
staff lock all entries? Once an intruder is inside the building and approaching
or entering the main office, is the situation better or worse? Can staff
protect themselves as well as the student body, or are they simply set up to be
the first victims?
Solutions
Options listed for improving
natural surveillance can further be enhanced by improving the receptionist’s
ability to detect and stop potential offenders from entering the building, as
follows:
a.
Secure all secondary entries, effectively
making them alarmed emergency exits. This obliges all visitors to use the main
entry. Only at this level of secure design do staff members have adequate access
control. Electronic controls governing the front door empower the receptionist
to immediately lock doors against a potential threat. Communication devices
should also make it possible to alert the entire school that a lockdown is in
place, and that other doors should be kept locked until the situation is
resolved.
b.
An entry vestibule could be added, adjacent
to the main office. Natural surveillance should be abundant in most directions.
When visitors enter an entry vestibule they physically cannot proceed further
until cleared by the receptionist, who controls all adjacent doors
electronically. In a high security environment, this might include
bullet-resistant glass and electronic screening for weapons. There might be a
pass-through window for suspicious packages as well. Cameras can provide a
remote viewing option, for screening from a distance. Only when staff members are
satisfied do they press a release button, allowing the visitor to enter the
facility.
5. How well can people see
what's going on inside the school?
Blind corners, "dead
walls," alcoves and stairwells provide "cover," or hidden areas,
for inappropriate behavior. These are
predictable locations for misbehavior because they are out from under the eyes
of the authorities. If 90 percent of the
school design incorporates natural surveillance, the remaining 10 percent will
be prime territory for drug use, bullying, harassment and other illicit
activities. Some areas are easily
observed when empty, but become difficult to watch during times of peak usage
-- the "transitional" times before and after classes, when most
conflicts occur.
Solutions
Provide direct, natural
surveillance. Staff should be able to
look up and see the source of a noise, or observe activity. If this is not the
case, the installation of windows or convex mirrors is the next best
option. Windows can provide natural
surveillance, while mirrors provide a secondary view. Convex mirrors can be used to open up
surveillance around all blind corners and dead walls. Mounted above head
height, convex mirrors can make it possible to observe behavior in a crowded
hallway. If neither of these are options, surveillance cameras (discussed
shortly) or patrols by staff or volunteers are the remaining
possibilities. In many cases, posters,
notices or artwork on windows has blocked natural surveillance. Removing these obstacles can make a
difference. Transparent or mesh
backpacks, open or screened lockers, and clothing restrictions are also options
that can increase visibility. Clear book bags are required in about 6 percent
of schools overall, with a high of 13 percent when it comes to middle schools
(Dinkes 2006). Finally, crowds can act as a visual screen, hiding activity in
an otherwise open area. Mirrors, cameras
or observation posts that provide a view over the heads of students can address
this concern. Scheduling can also be used to reduce crowds, such as by
staggering release times.
6. Do staff members have
immediate lockdown capability in classrooms and other locations?
Wherever staff and students are
situated during a crisis, predictable questions arise: how do we call for help,
make ourselves safe, protect students and resolve the situation? Every location on campus may have to serve as
a haven during a crisis. Unfortunately, most would be very difficult to lock
down on a moment's notice, and only some have reliable intercoms, telephones or
other communication devices readily available.
Classrooms and many other areas
will have outward opening doors, designed to meet fire and building code exit
requirements. If the door is standing open during an emergency, a teacher will
have to reach out into the hallway -- which could be the scene of the crime,
with bullets flying -- to pull the door closed. Even worse, she may have to
insert a key on the outside in order to lock the door. That means she will have to step into the
hallway, extract a key ring, find the correct key and insert it into the lock
-- possibly while shots are being fired. If she is in distress her physiology
will go through changes, as her blood rushes to her major muscle groups, for
fight or flight preparation. As a result, she will lose some or all of her fine
motor skills. The latter are required to manipulate a key, inserting it into a
lock. If this is the only means of securing the door, there's a grave risk of
failure. Her fingers may be trembling too hard to cooperate.
Alternately, entrapment is also
a risk in any classroom or office. If an intruder blocks the classroom door,
students will need a secondary escape route.
Solutions
Every school room should be
considered as a potential safe haven. It
should be possible to easily lock the door during a crisis without entering a
danger zone. Building and fire codes
require an outward opening door if room capacity goes beyond a specified number
of occupants. If the room serves a small group, it may be possible to install
an inward opening door. This would be advantageous in circumstances where
occupants want to close the door without first stepping into the hallway. In either case, the door should automatically
lock, or locking should be a simple maneuver, such as pushing in a button, and
teachers should be expected to keep the key on their person while on duty. One
of the lessons to come out of Columbine was that many students were able to
save themselves because doors were always kept in the locked position. Some of
the students who survived the Virginia Tech shootings in 2007 managed to do so
primarily by barricading a door with a large table.
Each room should have a
reliable communication device in it, usually an intercom or telephone. The
system needs to have the capacity for conference calling, so that many
classrooms can be on line with the office simultaneously during a crisis. The
office needs the ability to tell everyone, immediately, to lock down, relocate
or evacuate. Many times, schools will have working equipment in some rooms, but
not in others. Gymnasiums, playgrounds, parking lots and bathrooms are
frequently left disconnected from the public address system.
Ideally, if a 9-1-1 call is
placed from a hard-wired classroom phone, an enhanced 9-1-1 system will
identify the location. Unfortunately, when calls come from within multi-line
systems, this is often not an option: the emergency dispatcher only knows that
the call came from somewhere in the school. Alarm systems often have similar
weaknesses, identifying only an address or a large zone. Most cell phones’
locations cannot be pinpointed through this system. Check with your local
emergency services or alarm dispatcher to determine the limitations of your
system.
Each room should be examined to
determine where best to "take cover," or hide from flying bullets.
Generally, the thicker and denser the material, the better a shield it
provides. If walls are all paper thin, piled furniture may have to serve as a
barricade. If planning new construction,
thicker materials up to the six foot point in height should be used to provide
shielding in walls. Windows can be reinforced with security film, but this can
be prohibitively expensive at $4-5/square foot. Thicker glass is generally
safer, but even bullet-resistant glass has its limits, at $100/square foot.
Wire-mesh embedded in glass is not recommended.
Students have suffered severe injuries more than once when they have
accidentally put hands through this type of glass, usually inset into a door.
Each location in the school
will provide unique opportunities and challenges as safe havens. Hallways are
sometimes too vulnerable to internal threats, in which case students will be
better off retreating to a more enclosable space. Libraries can serve well only
if securable, with thick furniture and piles of books offering protection.
Gymnasiums rarely have communication devices in them or quick means by which to
secure doors. Panic-bars usually require the use of a hex key to secure them,
and only one of two staff members usually have the key. Solutions include wider
distribution of the key (and practice using it) or retrofitting the panic-bars
with conventional style keys on the inside (see
precisionhardware.com).
Finally, escape routes also
have to be considered. Ideally an emergency exit door, or in some cases
windows, should offer alternative means of escape in a crisis.
7. Is the overall school
climate pro-social?
The dangers inherent in an
anti-social school climate far outweigh the benefits of a pro-social physical
environment. In the extreme, a highly secure but affectively toxic school
resembles nothing more than a prison.
Building the perfect facility will be of little value not only if gangs
or cliques rule, but if even one disturbed student's anger is allowed to fester
unchecked.
Solutions
Establish an overall pro-social
behavior management plan for the school, such as the Effective Behavior Support
(EBS) or Positive Behavior Support (PBS) programs. Adopt a behavioral
curriculum, such Seattle Committee for Children's Second Step program. Have a
clear flow chart of preventive actions, crisis intervention and remediation
that staff can easily follow. If the same concepts are taught to all staff and
students, they are more likely to be accepted and followed. If staff all know
their responsibilities when misbehavior arises, problems are less likely to
fall through the cracks or escalate into larger crises. Any reinforcers for
antisocial behavior, such as exclusive clubs, merit close attention. Negative
graffiti, posters or other messages should be removed.
8. Are there identifiable or
predictable trouble spots or high risk locations?
In 2005, approximately 6 percent of
students ages 12-18 reported that they were afraid of attack or harm at school,
and 5% reported that they were afraid of attack or harm away from school. The same percentage reported avoiding school
activities or one or more places in school because they thought someone might
attack or harm them. There was no measurable difference by gender, but the fear
level in urban schools is twice that of other schools—10 percent rather than 5
percent (Dinkes 2006). This is an improvement over the data from the mid-1990s.
At that time, nine percent of
all students, and up to 15 percent of minority urban students, reported
"they avoided one or more places in school," and feared being
attacked at school or on the way to and from home (Kaufman 1999). One study placed 38 percent of on-campus
homicides in parking lots or at school bus stops, 30 percent in stairwells or
hallways, 23 percent elsewhere on the grounds, 21 percent in classrooms or offices,
11 percent in entry areas, nine percent in breezeways or center courts, six
percent in bathrooms and five percent in cafeterias (Kachur 1996). Places
identified by students as being avoided have remained consistent over the past
decade, including the entrance, any hallway or stairs, parts of the cafeteria,
restrooms, and other places inside the school building (Dinkes 2006). Each of these locations merits
individual attention.
Parking Lots and Bus Stops
Unsupervised congestion and
conflict commonly occur in parking lots and at bus stop areas, especially
during peak times. Cars provide
convenient, hidden areas in which students can engage in illicit behaviors
undetected any time of day. Closed car
doors muffle sound, and activity in one car can be hard to spot, hidden in a
sea of other vehicles. Bus pick up
areas, particularly after school, pose some risks. Students anxious to escape after school
jostle with each other for limited space.
Normal traffic-related conflict between buses, cars, bicycles and
pedestrians compounds the potential for violence. Crime on buses, including
hijacking, can be concerns as well.
As the demand for parking
exceeds available space, new parking areas will surface, officially or
unofficially.
Solutions
Using traffic cones, gates or
other devices, contain parking within a compact, easy-to-patrol area. Investigate any vehicles that circumvent this
restriction. Require highly visible registration stickers for all students'
vehicles, and keep records of license plate and vehicle descriptions, to make
identification easier. Enclose parking
lots with fencing, to restrict access by offenders. At the same time, leave
escape routes for pedestrians, to avoid entrapment by predators.
Another possibility is to use
assigned parking spots for students and staff when feasible. This makes a
trespasser’s vehicle stand out. CPTED principles call for avoiding the use of
“dead” walls adjacent to parking lots and using windows to increase
supervision. In addition, the alignment of rows of parked cars can be designed
to enhance natural surveillance.
If parking shifts to a new
location, converting a secondary entrance into a new "main" entrance
by default, install a "front office" at that location. This can
replace the original office, or augment it during peak hours. Another option is
to place another type of service at that location, such as the library, using
the librarian as a gate keeper. Even a hot dog stand would put a responsible
vendor on site, able to act as a witness, deter blatant misbehavior, or call
for help in an emergency.
When all else fails, video surveillance and
human patrolling can be added. For immense parking lots, emergency call buttons
may be wise investments too.
School buses are not
infrequently the site of conflicts. In those cases, video cameras in the buses
and radios or cell phones for drivers would be important. Identifying numbers
on bus rooftops will make them easier to identify from the air, in the unlikely
event of a hijacking. After a
Philadelphia-area bus driver absconded with a bus-load of students in January,
2002, there was a surge of interest in global positioning system (GPS)-based bus-tracking
devices, costing from $350 - $2500 per vehicle.
Hallways
Hallways suffer from a
population explosion every forty five minutes. Within a small window of time,
most of the student body is competing for space. Hallway locker doors and
locker owners create obstacles for the pedestrian traffic flow, as do social
clusters of students. Staff members generally avoid hallways during these brief
rush hours, and when they are present lack natural surveillance beyond the
students closest at hand. A commotion at
the far end of the hall is completely camouflaged by the chaos blocking the
view. Overcrowding, combined with petty conflicts, can lead to violence.
Solutions
Wider spaces and otherwise
unoccupied niches often act as social gathering spots. By selectively building
these spaces out of the traffic flow, some of the congestion can be reduced.
Lockers can be spread at a greater distance from each other, reducing conflict
between neighboring locker users.
Lockers can be moved to separate locker bays, but as with any isolated
spot, if there is no natural surveillance over this area it is at risk of
becoming a trouble spot. A compromise design effectively widens the hallway
periodically, bringing the lockers out of the traffic flow without isolating
them entirely from view. Where second
stories exist, use them to provide natural surveillance for staff. Place staff
break-rooms at appropriate locations to at least give the impression of
surveillance -- mirrored windows can leave students guessing as to whether or
not they can be seen. Convex mirrors
placed high improve surveillance over crowds and around corners. Where the architecture fails to enhance
surveillance, cameras or human patrolling may be additional options to
consider. School officials should avoid allowing the line of sight to be
blocked by vending machines or other large items. In many schools, classroom
doors swing outward, due to fire code consideration. If the door remains ajar,
jutting into the hallway, they may block natural surveillance along the length
of the hall. Classrooms are more secure if doors are kept locked and shut.
While they are open they should be opened fully, so that they are flush to the
wall.
Stairwells
Stairwells, like hallways, may
suffer from intermittent congestion, alternating with periods of disuse. In
either case, there is the added risk that comes with climbing and
descending. Stairwells are often hidden
from view; fire doors may seal them off entirely. In between rush hours, stairwells can provide
hidden areas, and fire doors can muffle sound. Stairs may be "travel
predictors," which offenders can rely on to place a victim in their path
at a certain time.
Solutions
The more open the stairway
design, the better. Wherever solid walls
are blocking surveillance, look for ways to install openings or windows.
Exterior, isolated fire stairwells can be made safer by the extensive use of
glass or wrought iron grates for exterior walls. Short of these measures, mirrors, cameras and
patrolling are additional options.
Grounds
In 2003-04, 36 percent of U.S. public schools controlled access to
school grounds with locked gates (Dinkes 2006), a significant jump from 24
percent of schools reporting doing so in the late 1990s (Kaufman 1999). Outdoor
areas are extremely difficult to control.
Especially if designed for multi-purpose use, territoriality is often
vague -- anyone who wants to is welcome to treat school grounds as open public
space. Unfortunately, this can lead to
visits from undesirables who put students at risk. If schools serve double duty as community
centers and unofficial skateboard parks, nobody really knows who is in charge
anymore. Landscaping and outbuildings
can hide illicit activity; while outdoor shelters can become magnets for people
with no better place to go. Playing
field bathrooms are frequently problematic, serving as illicit meeting places
or predictable locations for cornering prey.
Solutions
Wrought-iron fencing is the
territorial-marker and access control device of choice. It provides strong
access control, is extremely vandal resistant, and lacks enough surface space
to attract much graffiti. Although it costs considerably more than mesh
fencing, it is a good long-term investment that enhances school image and
climate, and leaves natural surveillance intact, while defining and controlling
official entry points.
The use of written warnings by
law enforcement officials to ban certain people from school property has also
been effective. Officers can ban known drug dealers or gang members, as well as
students who have been suspended from school. Arrests of those who violate
these warnings may deter potential troublemakers from loitering on campus.
Heighten area definition to
enhance territoriality. Invite students, service clubs and area residents to
develop paths, swing sets, gardens, sandboxes, slides, wetlands, natural
meadows, tennis courts, and amphitheaters, as well as traditional soccer or
baseball fields. Student, neighbor or service group participation can give them
a sense of ownership. If they subsequently see problems occurring on the site,
they will be more likely to call authorities.
Amenities should be factored
into grounds development. Driveways and
service roads will be needed, but can attract unwelcome users if not controlled
with gates, barricades and/or speed bumps. Large crowds for soccer tournaments
generate parking overflow, litter and sanitation problems. They will need
bathrooms, drinking water, and shelter.
Benches or bleachers should also be considered. Leaving the
under-bleacher area exposed for surveillance from each end is productive. Unfortunately,
amenities can also serve as magnets for undesirable trespassers, and can be
vulnerable to vandals. Boost natural
surveillance of vulnerable amenities with non-glare lighting and clear
sight-lines for neighbors.
An in-residence caretaker is a
good option to consider--trade mobile home housing for an overnight presence.
Caretakers can be carefully screened with police background checks, and usual
school ground restrictions against alcohol, drugs and weapons would apply. If
vandalism is extensive, an on-site caretaker may be more economical than other
options, such as paid security. Free or low-cost on-site housing may be
attractive to new or retired teachers on tight budgets. Video cameras and paid
security represent two further possibilities.
Entry areas
Entry areas are travel
predictors and gathering spots.
Offenders targeting particular students know they can find them in entry
areas at predictable times. If security measures focus on visitors only after
they enter the building, violence is more likely to occur before entering the
school's locus of control. In this way, improved internal security can directly
raise the external level of risk.
Pedestrian traffic jams while waiting to clear a security checkpoint
create a mass of unprotected potential victims, lingering outdoors. Student
conflicts inside school may manage to contain themselves only to the point at
which parties exit the front doors.
Snipers and drive-by shooters can anticipate easy prey before or after
school, when crowds provide easy targets outside the main doors.
Solutions
Upgrade front office design to
provide natural surveillance over the exterior entry area as well as the
interior foyer and hallway, as discussed earlier. Reconsider any security measures that create
vulnerable gathering spots. If tight security at the entry point is required,
consider staggering attendance times for each grade, thinning the crowd. Provide an adult presence wherever students
congregate, and provide communication devices.
Provide shelter for students waiting for rides, buses, or entry, with
low walls or stanchions that can be used for protection, either from bullets or
out of control vehicles. At the same
time, take care to maintain natural lines of sight -- don't build walls that
eliminate natural surveillance. Install
speed bumps or other traffic control devices to slow traffic near the main
entry.
Breezeways
Sprawling campuses often
connect buildings with breezeways for a variety of reasons. They're cheaper
than enclosed hallways, avoid violating code restrictions on building sizes,
and in some cases are considered an aesthetic feature. Regardless of motive, breezeways are
unprotected travel predictors. They may be under lit as well, and can lack
natural surveillance. Even during rush hours, particularly in bad weather,
staff don't linger there. If surveillance cameras are used, bright daylight outside
tunnel-like breezeways may backlight subjects, making useful pictures difficult
to obtain.
Solutions
Working in cooperation with
building codes, look for ways to enclose breezeways and connect buildings, shifting
from a sprawling campus to more of a fortress design. At the same time, keep
natural surveillance as strong as possible by using windows rather than solid
walls. Seal off all secondary entry
points, such as breezeway entries, with fire doors. The doors should close and
lock automatically. Staff should have keys or proximity cards, and doors can be
staffed while open between classes.
Bathrooms
Bathrooms have a reputation as
unsafe locations, where illicit activity and bullying are common. Many students
avoid using school bathrooms altogether for this reason. Bathrooms are
frequently located in isolated corners of buildings, away from natural
surveillance. Occasionally they are also near secondary entries, providing
opportunities for unobserved trespassers and easy exits. Double door entries
muffle typical bathroom noises, but they also muffle cries for help, sounds of
assaults, acts of destruction and the drift of cigarette smoke. Toilet stalls provide even greater privacy,
and are often covered with graffiti.
Solutions
Bathrooms should be installed
adjacent to supervised areas, within direct line of sight of school staff. Maze
entries should replace double door entries, for a few reasons: alarming sounds
are more apt to be noticed from outside; escaping predators is much easier;
offenders cannot count on the sound of the outer door opening to warn them when
an authority figure is entering; cigarette smoke is no longer masked; and as an
added benefit, fewer un-sanitized hands have to share the same door knob or
plate. Regular maintenance is
essential. Take back ownership of toilet
stalls by painting over graffiti, and even consider replacing it with
pro-social messages. Anticipate the pro-social messages being vandalized
regularly. Replace them relentlessly.
Many schools have had problems
with several students gathering in one stall to smoke, or sell or use drugs.
When officials approach the area, students typically flush any evidence. Using
magnetic latches on stall doors can help prevent this type of problem by making
it harder for students to delay entry by officials. In addition, some schools
avoid the use of drop ceilings, which can be used to hide contraband. Vandalism-resistant
materials can be used for stall partitions. Most important, adequate
supervision of school bathrooms is always required, no matter how thoughtful
the design.
If smoking in bathrooms is an
overwhelming problem, consider installing high-sensitivity smoke or flame
detectors. These devices can set off alarms or silently send messages to office
staff.
Cafeterias
Cafeterias are predictable
gathering spots. As a result, they can serve as easy destination points for
intruders bent on destruction. This was the case with the Thurston shootings in
1998. Combined weaknesses in that campus
layout included "dead" walls blocking surveillance to the north, an
unsupervised parking lot, access to a dark breezeway and an insecure cafeteria
entry. Images picked up on videotape,
capturing Kip Kinkle walking across the parking lot, wearing a bulky trench
coat, failed to convey any critical information, such as the suspended
student's identity or what was under the coat. Victims were shot in the
breezeway as well as in the cafeteria.
Another concern is intentional
food contamination. There have been instances where students have contaminated
food in accessible areas (such as poisoning a salsa bar.)
Solutions
The greater the accessibility,
the more vigilance is required. This applies to all locations, including
cafeterias. Escape routes are critical,
as are communication devices to call for help. If screening occurs at some
distance from the cafeteria, there is less likelihood of an offender reaching
this destination undetected. A locked or
supervised breezeway might have deterred Kip Kinkle from his chosen route.
Other group gathering spaces, including gymnasiums and theaters, have similar
vulnerabilities.
To deter intentional food
contamination, schools can position open food service areas and beverage
dispensers near cash registers and teachers’ tables to increase natural surveillance.
Security cameras in these areas can also serve as deterrents.
School Size, Renovation and
Rebuilding
The larger the school, the more
of a challenge it is to secure. Multiple
entry points will require an equivalent number of guardians, or will compromise
access control. A labyrinth of add-ons
often incorporates numerous blind corners and niches, creating hidden areas
attractive for delinquent behavior, and thus compromising natural surveillance.
Individual at-risk students can feel lost in a large student body, and may not
draw needed attention until it is too late.
If the student body is quite large, staff and students alike may have
trouble determining who belongs on campus and who doesn't, undermining territoriality.
Research makes a strong case
for small schools in order to promote intimate learning communities, boost
academic performance, improve the likelihood of personal connections and
attention, reduce isolation and achievement gaps, build group cohesion, and
make staff coordination easier, as well as to improve school safety. The research suggests a size limit of 3-400
students in elementary schools, no more than 600 in junior high schools, and
between 600 and 900 students in high schools. (Lackney 2000; Duke and
Trautvetter 2001).
Many schools do not or cannot
accommodate these limitations. In those cases, a number of options can be
considered. Converting excess doors into alarmed emergency exits, sealing off
under-utilized sections of the school with metal accordion-style grates, recruiting
volunteer hall monitors and installing surveillance cameras are some
possibilities. Schedules can be staggered to reduce congestion and conflict in
the hallways. Large schools can be divided into a number of smaller,
specialized wings, houses, families, academies, or schools-within-schools,
focusing on arts, sciences, language immersion, trades, career exploration or
other subjects. From a CPTED
perspective, any arrangement that makes it easier for students to know each
other and build bonds while enhancing staff surveillance and access control
abilities is a step in the right direction.
.
Security Technology Overview
Ideally, a school's physical structure should
inherently provide adequate natural surveillance, natural access control and
territoriality to minimize the need for technological fixes. Unfortunately, this ideal structure rarely
exists; improvements are usually necessary. These may take the form of short-term
fixes, major remodeling, extra staffing, or electronic technology.
Security technology has made
amazing strides in the past two years, but it’s no magic wand. It can fall
short in a number of ways:
1.
Heavy-handed use of technology can generate
resistance from individuals uncomfortable with a big-brother or prison-like
atmosphere, which can undermine a positive school climate.
2.
The technology may fail to compensate for
design weaknesses, providing only an illusion of substantially improved safety.
For example, an electronically secured main entry is of little value if the
back door remains uncontrolled. Cameras and monitors won’t stop an intruder on
their own.
3.
Equipment can be cumbersome, expensive,
unsupportable and counterproductive. New
technology can quickly prove itself obsolete, or dependent upon unproven
distributors for ongoing maintenance and repairs. If manufacturers close down, or vendors
disappear, schools may be left with expensive, non-working security equipment
that is difficult to repair or replace, with little or no re-sale value. After
reasoned consideration, more than one school district has chosen more teachers
and less security technology as the preferred investment strategy.
4.
Some equipment only reaches its full
potential if specialists are available to operate it, monitor it or respond to
it. Facilities can lock themselves into a plan that requires security staff at
critical locations, including at a monitoring station. If the funding for
staffing falls through the entire security plan can become dysfunctional.
5.
Hastily chosen technology may not even come
close to addressing the presenting problem. For example, passive electronic
surveillance can provide evidence against bullies, and that can be an effective
deterrent, but such an approach would be ineffective against suicidal armed
intruders.
The bottom line is, go slowly
enough to methodically analyze your needs and whether technological fixes are
the best tools for addressing a problem. Most security cameras, ID cards,
burglar alarms, metal and drug detectors would have had no bearing on the
outcome of most of the highly publicized school shootings over the past
decade. Solid access control and
improved emergency communication, on the other hand, might have made a
difference. Schools with chronic
violence and small budgets won't be served well by the same approaches taken in
schools where violence is rare and budgets are large. Always bring the
discussion back to the original problem being addressed, and see if the
technology is a good match.
All that being said, there are
many situations where technology can be immensely helpful. However, identifying
which specific make, model or system to use requires very up-to-date research. Technology
is evolving so quickly that almost any specific equipment seen on a site visit
that was installed more than a year or two ago, is unlikely to be state of the
art, and could even be obsolete. The same applies to recommendations published
in hard-copy documents, including this one. Installers and system integrators
who can provide solid references, and who are currently active in the field,
may be the best sources of up-to-date information on current state-of-the-art
equipment.
Communication devices
Telephones, radios,
cell phones, intercoms, public address systems and pagers are the least controversial, and possibly the most sensible,
technological fixes that can be employed.
Trouble can occur anywhere on or near campus. If staff can immediately
call for help, damage can be contained.
Using staff to patrol the grounds will be of limited value if they have
no communication devices; more than likely they are simply being set up as the
first victims. Leaving them isolated in classrooms can have a similar effect.
The ideal hand-held, voice-based communication device will combine cell phone
and radio or walkie-talkie functions in a single unit -- a standard feature in
Nextel phones (www.Nextel.com ). Users can
reach an individual or pre-determined group with one push of a button.
Additional features continue to expand on cell phones, and can include email,
internet and GPS features. Prices vary considerably, depending on the number of
cameras purchased and services subscribed to. Radio band-widths may involve
FCC-approved licenses that can come with hefty annual fees. Ham radio groups, working
with local disaster response groups and the Red Cross, can be a resource,
especially useful when power sources for other means of communication fail. One
such group is the
Wireless technology is the
wave of the immediate future, but without cell towers or routers acting as
boosters, most wireless technologies will be of little or no use. Sparsely
populated areas may not contain enough customers to justify the expense to a
private company of constructing towers. Installing wireless routers throughout
a campus or community may be an essential component of a wireless communication
plan. (www.tropos.com )
Annunciators are lights or buzzers indicating an open
door. Wired into new construction, they
can alert staff at a central console when a secondary or emergency door has
been opened. Augmented with cameras,
these allow staff to observe behavior at all entry points, inside and out, and
to quickly respond.
Alarms triggered by smoke or flame, or set off by
manually operated pull stations, are required by fire code. More sophisticated
systems can also send messages to a central receiving station, pinpointing the
location of a problem. Panic button
alarms can be built into intercom systems; identification alarms can be worn as
pendants. Combination identification/ location alarms identify, locate and
track people using them. “Smart” cameras (discussed shortly) can recognize
specific shapes or movements, such as a person falling down, and trigger
alarms. Depending on the sophistication and reach of equipment, costs can range
anywhere from a few hundred dollars for an in-house wiring job to $100,000 or
more for a 40-acre campus-wide system.
Emergency Notification products are
quickly becoming commonplace. A number of companies offer mass communication
services and technology for schools and communities—a service that has drawn
considerable attention after the Virginia Tech tragedy. Virginia Tech was
looking into upgrading their emergency "VT Alerts" system well before
the Seung-Hui Cho shooting rampage in 2007. The product they selected comes
from 3n (National Notification Network), a California-based mass notification
systems provider. It is designed to communicate via cell phone text message,
online instant messages, phone calls and e-mails (www.3nonline.com).
Comparable products and manufacturers include Intelligent Wireless Solutions (www.inwireless.com
), The MIR3 inCampusAlert™ Intelligent Notification™ system (www.mir3.com ) and Wide Area Rapid
Notification (WARN) (www.warncalling.com ). A number of
districts have recently signed on with ParentLink (www.parentlink.net), including
·
references for successful installations elsewhere,
·
range of devices and means of delivery,
·
speed of delivery,
·
volume capacity,
·
ease of use,
·
start up costs, and
·
ongoing costs.
Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) can be
used for tracking data, sending messages, and in some cases pulling up live
video images from cameras linked to a school network or an internet protocol
(ip) address.
Access control Technology
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